A Review of Man-in-the-Middle Attacks by Gangan, Subodh
 1 
A Review of Man-in-the-Middle Attacks 
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Abstract: This paper presents a survey of man-in-the-middle (MIM) attacks in communication 
networks and methods of protection against them. In real time communication, the attack can in 
many situations be discovered by the use of timing information. The most common attacks occur 
due to Address Resolution Protocol (ARP) cache poisoning, DNS spoofing, session hijacking, 
and SSL hijacking.  
 
Introduction 
Man-in-the-Middle (MIM) attacks make the task of keeping data secure and private particularly 
challenging since attacks can be mounted from remote computers with fake addresses. Whereas 
communications security was primarily that of breaking of encryption transformations (as in the 
case of the Enigma machine during the Second World War [1]), the problem of security in 
computer networks also involves active interference by intruders, and of these MIM attack is one 
of the most spectacular. The MIM attack takes advantage of the weaknesses in the authentication 
protocols being used by the communicating parties. Since authentication is generally provided by 
third parties who issue certificates, the system of certificate generation becomes another source 
of potential weakness.  
 
The MIM attack allows the intruder or the unauthorized party to snoop on data through the 
backdoor. This intervention is also being used by companies to pry upon their employees and for 
adware. For example, in early 2015, it was discovered that Lenovo computers came preinstalled 
with adware called Superfish that injects advertising on browsers such as Google Chrome and 
Internet Explorer. Superfish installs a self-generated root certificate into the Windows certificate 
store and then resigns all SSL certificates presented by HTTPS sites with its own certificate. This 
could allow hackers to potentially steal sensitive data like banking credentials or to spy on the 
users’ activities [2]. 
 
Cryptographic protocols designed to provide communications security over a computer network 
are a part of Transport Layer Security (TLS). These protocols use X.509 which is an ITU-T 
standard that specifies standard formats for public key certificates, certificate revocation lists, 
attribute certificates, and a certification path validation algorithm [3]. The X.509 certificates are 
used for authentication the counterparty and to negotiate a symmetric key. As mentioned, 
certificate authorities are a weak link within the security system. In electronic mail, although 
servers do require SSL encryption, contents are processed and stored in plaintext on the servers.  
 
Google and Mozilla recently announced that they would stop accepting certificates issue by 
CNNIC (China Internet Network Information Center) [4]. According to Google’s Security Blog 
[5]: 
On Friday, March 20th, we became aware of unauthorized digital certificates for several 
Google domains. The certificates were issued by an intermediate certificate authority 
apparently held by a company called MCS Holdings. This intermediate certificate was 
issued by CNNIC. CNNIC is included in all major root stores and so the misissued 
certificates would be trusted by almost all browsers and operating systems. … 
We promptly alerted CNNIC and other major browsers about the incident, and we 
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blocked the MCS Holdings certificate in Chrome with a CRLSet push. CNNIC responded 
on the 22nd to explain that they had contracted with MCS Holdings on the basis that 
MCS would only issue certificates for domains that they had registered. However, rather 
than keep the private key in a suitable HSM, MCS installed it in a man-in-the-middle 
proxy. These devices intercept secure connections by masquerading as the intended 
destination and are sometimes used by companies to intercept their employees’ secure 
traffic for monitoring or legal reasons. The employees’ computers normally have to be 
configured to trust a proxy for it to be able to do this. However, in this case, the presumed 
proxy was given the full authority of a public CA, which is a serious breach of the CA 
system…This situation is similar to a failure by ANSSI in 2013. 
 
Consider two individuals, namely Alice and Bob, communicating with each other. The third-
party, Eve, is the MIM attacker. The communication between Alice and Bob starts after the 
initial handshake to authenticate each other. But if the authentication protocol is not strong then 
Eve can impersonate as the other communicating party to both Alice and Bob. 
 
 
Figure 1: Normal communication between Alice and Bob 
 
 
Figure 2: MIM attack performed by Eve 
In the MIM attack, Eve will start its communication with both Alice and Bob. The messages 
between Alice and Bob will go through Eve as Eve will impersonate Bob as Alice and Alice as 
Bob. Both Alice and Bob won’t know about Eve intercepting their messages. Therefore, Eve 
take advantages of Alice and Bob without their consent and obtains vital information.  
 
The hallmark of the knowledge society is uncertainty [6],[7] together with the problems of 
privacy and identity in the networked world [8]-[9]. Traditional techniques of cryptography [10] 
that use random sequences are one way to deal with these issues at the level of signal integrity 
[11]-[15]. Backdoor entry, of which MIM is one, can be used by good and bad actors [16]-[18]. 
One way to avoid certain MIM attacks is the implementation of the double lock protocol but it 
was observed that this method was not successful because the man in the middle attack was still 
persistent inside the network [19].  
 
The Double Signature Double Lock Protocol protocol uses hashing technique where the 
signatures of the 2 parties communicating are exchanged with the help of hashed digits and the 
signatures are verified. If the signatures don't match then the communication doesn't take place 
and the man in the middle attack can be avoided because the attacker would be completely 
unaware of the hashed digit used for authentication of the communication. This paper presents a 
survey of the problems with authentication that can be exploited to mount MIM attacks.  
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Examples of MIM attacks 
An example of an offline MIM attack is the interception of a letter by the mailman who either 
just reads its contents or even replaces its contents. One can visualize an online MIM attack in a 
public place like a mall that provides free Wi-Fi connection available that has a wireless router 
with malicious software installed in it. If a user visits a bank's website at that time from phone or 
laptop, he or she may end up losing bank credentials. These attacks can be caused because of the 
following reasons: 
 
1. ARP Cache Poisoning  
2. DNS Spoofing 
3. Session Hijacking 
4. SSL Hijacking 
 
Address Resolution Protocol Communication (ARP) 
In the normal ARP communication, the host PC will send a packet which has the source and 
destination IP address inside the packet and will broadcast it to all the devices connected to the 
network. The device which has the target IP address will only send the ARP reply with its MAC 
address in it and then communication takes place.  The ARP protocol is not a secured protocol 
and the ARP cache doesn't have a foolproof mechanism which results in a big problem.  
 
The ARP reply packet can be easily spoofed and it can be sent to the machine which sent the 
ARP request without knowing that this is not the actual machine, but an attack to cause data 
breaches. This happens because the ARP cache table will be updated as decided by the attacker 
and so all the network traffic will go through the attacker and he will have all the data and make 
the most of it. This is the best kind of an attack on the Local Area Network. 
 
Different types of tools are available in the market for ARP Cache poisoning some of them are 
Ettercap, Dsniff and Cain and Abel’s etc. We can try to control this ARP cache poisoning by 
using Dynamic ARP Inspection (DAI). DAI is a security feature that is used to validate the ARP 
packets in a network and to discard the invalid IP to MAC address bindings. We need to carry 
out this inspection on the Ethernet switches by manually configuring them, but we can't do these 
on the switches which aren't compatible with this inspection [20].  
 
 
 
Figure 3: Regular traffic flow between two Computers 
 
The ARP request and replies don’t require any authentication or verification since all the hosts 
on the network will trust the ARP replies. We can also update the ARP cache table by inserting a 
static entry for the gateway so the attacker wouldn't manipulate with the gateway entry in the 
table but this is not a fool-proof solution as we need to change the ARP table gateway entry 
regularly whenever we relocate. The secure socket layer is used by HTTP or transport layer for 
secure connection. The web browser will look for certificates of the web server and authenticate 
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its validity. If the certificate is authenticated we will have a secure connection but if we have any 
problem with the certificate it would say as untrusted.            
 
ARP Cache Poisoning                                               
In ARP cache poisoning, the attacker would be sniffing onto the network by controlling the 
network switch to monitor the network traffic and spoof the ARP packets between the host and 
the destination PC and perform the MIM attack. 
 
 
DNS Spoofing 
The target, in this case, will be provided with fake information which would lead to loss of 
credentials. As explained earlier this is a kind of online MIM attack where the attacker has 
created a fake website of your bank, so when you visit your bank website you will be redirected 
to the website created by the attacker and then the attacker will gain all your credentials. 
Whenever we enter a website on our PC, DNS request is sent to the DNS Server and we will get 
a DNS reply message in the response. This is shown with the help of figure 4. 
 
            
Figure 4: DNS Communication between the host and the DNS Server  
 
This DNS request and reply are mapped together with a unique identification number. If the 
attacker gets hold of the unique identification number then by disguising the victim with a 
corrupt packet containing the identification number the attack can be launched. The attacker 
redirects the victim to the fake website by performing ARP cache poisoning to detour the DNS 
request message to which the fake reply packet is sent. 
 
 
Figure 5: The attacker performs MIM attack using DNS Spoofing 
 
The host computer wants to connect to a website so it will send a DNS query request to the DNS 
server but due to the MIM attack the attacker will intercept this DNS query and send a fake DNS 
reply to the host PC. The host PC wouldn’t come to know whether the response is legitimate or 
not and it will start communicating with the malicious website of the attacker which causes data 
breaches.  
 
Session Hijacking  
As the name suggests a session is established when we have a connection between the client and 
a server. Transmission Control Protocol is referred as a session since it first establishes a 
connection, then transfers the data and finally terminates the connection. This is known as the 3-
way handshake process which shows how a proper session looks like. One of the popular session 
hijackings is done by stealing cookies with the help of Hyper Text Transfer Protocol (HTTP). 
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In any website one requires username and password for authentication and establishing the 
session. Once the session is established, unless and until one logs out the session is not 
terminated, so to administer session cookies are used that provide information that the session is 
still continuing. If the attacker gets hold of this cookie he/she can have the session information 
which might be secretive.  
 
Figure 6: Session Establishment between the host PC and Web Server  
 
The figure shows how a normal session is established between the host PC and the Web Server. 
As one can see the session cannot be established without authentication. 
  
Session hijacking attack 
Once the session is established between the host PC and the web server the attacker can obtain 
certain parts of the session establishment which is done by capturing the cookies that were used 
for the session establishment. As shown in the figure 6 after the session establishment the 
attacker obtains the session information between the host PC and the web server and controls the 
session. 
 
Secure Socket Layers 
One needs to provide security while communicating with network devices which can be obtained 
with the help of Secure Socket Layers (SSL) or Transport Layer Security (TLS) by using 
encryption methodology. One uses this protocol with other protocols for secure implementation 
of the services that the protocol provides. HTTPS is the most commonly used protocol and most 
of the online banking services and email services use it to ensure security between their servers 
and your web browser.  
 
In order to understand how exactly this protocol works consider the following example. Suppose 
the host PC wants to connect to yahoo mail account then the communication process starts as 
stated below: 
1. Using HTTP port 80, the client web browser will connect to http://mail.yahoo.com. 
2. The web server will process this request and redirects the client to the HTTP version of 
this website using HTTP code 302 redirect. 
3. The client will now connect to https://mail.yahoo.com using port 443. 
4. The server will provide a certificate to the host PC to verify the identity of the website 
using the digital signature. 
5. The host PC will now verify this certificate with the list of certificates it has. 
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Figure 7: SSL protocol communication  
 
If the certificate doesn’t match with the list of certificates of the host PC then we say that the 
website has failed to verify its identity so the host PC will get a certificate validation error. Even 
after we get this error we can proceed to connect to the website but it might be risky because we 
won't know whether it is the actual website we need to connect to. This SSL attack is explained 
more precisely with the help of a practical example. 
 
Current Scenario 
 As we all know that there are lots of people surfing the internet and the numbers are increasing 
day by day. So it becomes necessary to protect the data that is available on the internet and 
maintain internet security because there are lot many bad guys out in the world who would like 
to take advantage of this and have data breaches and different kinds of attacks without being get 
noticed.  
 
As mentioned in the Introduction, CNNIC, which is dministered by Cyberspace Administration 
of China (CAC), issued some untrusted digital certificates called as the test certificates, to the 
different companies and the general public, which were valid for two weeks and would get 
expired by April 2015 [21].    
 
 By loading this certificate into the firewall device, the firewall would issue certificates for 
different domains and an SSL MIM attack could be performed [21]. This is because almost each 
and every operating system and web browsers will trust this altered certificate and it would cause 
a major problem in the Internet Certificate Authority system. 
 
By trusting the certificate the web browser would create problem for itself since the certificate 
holder could easily decode and observe the communication going on inside the network without 
providing any prior warnings to the web browser. As discussed earlier the bad guys present 
outside would have their fake website to appear whenever the users would like to visit a specific 
website and without knowing the users would be opened to the MIM attack.   
                   
The web browsers update their current version in order to take into account these loopholes and 
release them into the market. The user will then upgrade to this latest version and remain 
updated. So what we have found out is that the today’s internet still relies on to encrypt the 
sensitive data. Since almost all the operating systems trust most of the certificates it takes just 
one fake certificate to take advantage of this situation by compromising the security of the 
complete system. 
                    
Another example of the MIM attack is the SSL attack for popular domains such as google.com, 
yahoo.com, live.com, and skype.com [21].  The fake SSL certificates were issued by Comodo, 
the trusted certificate authority. But the attack was discovered and the false certificates were 
revoked.  
                    
The web services would be altered because of this certificate facilitating different kinds of 
attacks such as phishing attacks. In order to check the validity of TLS certificates, the browsers 
use revocation lists. But these revocation lists are unavailable if the internet has outage. It has 
therefore been suggested that the untrusted certificates need to be permanently coded into the 
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browsers. Most of the operating systems available now have an automatic updater installed for 
the revoked certificates. The automatic update will automatically download the canceled 
certificate without the knowledge of the user.     
                        
Figure 8 shows us the month wise statistical data from December 2013 to November 2014 by 
Symantec Corporation of the different browsers used in our day to day life. We can depict from 
the figure that the Internet Explorer is the most vulnerable to the diversified attacks. 
 
 
Figure 8: Graphical Representation of the different web browsers [22] 
 
As we can see from Figure 9, the majority of the network attacks are Denial of Service, Brute 
force and browser attacks. The Denial of Service, browser and SSL attack all constitute the MIM 
attack. 
 
Figure 9. Top Network Attacks (McAfee Labs [22]) 
 
Practical Implementation 
In order to understand the MIM attacks in a better way, we discuss a small laboratory 
experiment. The attack is based on DNS spoofing and SSL stripping, the operating system used 
for performing the attack is Kali Linux (64 bit). This operating system has some inbuilt tools for 
the network sniffing, ARP poisoning, online attacks and network scanners etc.  
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In the experiment, carried out virtually from home, connecting to the VPN of the Tulsa IA Lab 
so that I can have a number of live hosts on the network to perform an attack. The Cisco 
AnyConnect Secure Mobility Client VPN software was used to connect to the lab virtually. The 
Tulsa IA Lab has ESXI Servers to which we get connected remotely with the help of this 
software and VSphere Client, hence we get connected to the network.  
 
DNS Spoofing Attack 
1: The ettercap tool which we use to perform the MIM attack has an inbuilt file          etter.dns 
which we need to modify so we need to find the location of the file. 
Syntax: locate etter.dns 
 
2: We will get the location of the file from the previous step and then we need to edit this file as 
per our convenience to target the victim. 
Syntax: vim /etc/ettercap/etter.dns 
 
3: We want the user to get denied to access facebook.com so we just add a line in the etter.dns 
file i.e. we enter a host name and create a pointer for it. In this example, the pointer is pointing to 
my IP address of Kali Linux (10.15.0.9) but we can create any pointer as per our convenience. 
Since I already knew my IP address I just added the pointer, otherwise I would have to use the 
command ifconfig to find my IP address. Whenever we make changes make sure we write and 
quit before exiting. 
Syntax: *.facebook.com A 10.15.0.9 
 
4: We will start a web server on my Kali Linux so that whenever someone tries to open a specific 
domain he/she will be directed here.  
Syntax: service apache2 start 
 
5: We can also create an index file for our web server which the victim will see whenever he/she 
tries to access the web page that we have targeted. 
Syntax: cat /var/www/index.html 
 
6: We need to figure out our gateway so that the ARP Poisoning attack can be performed and 
redirect all the requests to our Computer instead of the gateway.  
Syntax: netstat –nr (To find the gateway) 
 
7: DNS Spoof plugin is used to perform this attack.  
Syntax: ettercap –Q –T –M arp –P dns_spoof /10.15.0.254/ /10.15.0.7/ 
As you can see in this syntax we are specifically targeting a victim whose IP is 10.15.0.7 but we 
can also target the whole network just by excluding the target machines IP. 
 
8: The DNS spoof plug in will activate now and the victim will be spoofed. Now as soon as the 
victim will open facebook.com in his web browser he will be redirected to the web server created 
by us. 
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9: As you can see in the image below that the victim tried to visit the facebook.com and the 
permission is denied which means we are successful in performing the attack. You can also 
check in the address bar which says it's not a secured connection. So whenever this kind of 
attacks takes place you should verify whether it's a secure connection or not. 
 
    
 
    Figure 10: Victim denied access to the website  
 
ARP Spoofing and SSL Stripping  
The block diagram showed bellow tells us about what happens exactly when we perform these 
kinds of attacks. 
 
 
Figure 11: Practical representation of the devices functionality  
 
1: In order to establish this attack we need to enable IP forwarding. We need to check the value 
to verify whether IP forwarding is pre-configured or not. If we get the value as ‘1’ then we say 
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that IP forwarding is enabled but if we get the value as ‘0’ then we need to enable the IP 
forwarding.     
 
Syntax: echo 1 > /proc/sys/net/ipv4/ip_forward       (To enable IP forwarding) 
Syntax: cat /proc/sys/net/ipv4/ip_forward                 (To check the value) 
 
2: We need to redirect the traffic from source port 80 to the destination port 8080 and the traffic 
should mainly consist of TCP. All of this will take place by updating the NAT table. Whenever 
the conditions would match the packets will be redirected to port 8080 as specified. 
Syntax: iptables –t nat –A PREROUTING –p tcp –destination-port 80 –j REDIRECT –to-port 
8080 
 
3: Here also we need to find the IP address of the gateway. This is similar to the step 6 of the 
previous example.  
 
4: In order to identify any live host on the network we can use the Nmap software or else if we 
know the IP address of the target machine we can directly use that IP address. In our case, we 
already know our target and the IP address of the target is 10.15.0.15 
 
5: Before performing the SSL stripping we need to redirect the HTTP traffic. This is done with 
the help of ARP Spoofing. 
Syntax: arpspoof –i eth0 –t 10.15.0.15 –r 10.15.0.254 
 
6: In order to obtain the credentials for a particular website we use SSL stripping. Suppose the 
user visits www.facebook.com, in order to login to facebook the user needs to login with his 
credentials and by performing SSL stripping we can steal these credentials (user id and 
password).  
Syntax: sslstrip –l 8080  
 
7:  Once the SSL strip is established we can get the credentials in a log file which can be 
accessed easily. We can see the image below which shows us that we were successful in 
performing the attack and stealing the credentials. 
Syntax: cat sslstrip.log 
    
Figure 12: Successful attacked performed to obtain the user credentials  
 
So in order to avoid ARP cache poisoning and DNS spoofing practically we need to monitor the 
network thoroughly to identify the probe packets coming inside the network for performing the 
attack. We need to build a strong and secure network with the help of firewalls, Intrusion 
Detection, and Prevention Systems. If we are using the web browser to login to a particular 
website with our credentials we need to make sure that we log in securely. This can be verified 
with the syntax HTTPS instead of HTTP on the URL tab. What HTTP will do is that it will 
provide a secure connection between you and the website used so that we would not face any 
breach.
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Concluding Remarks 
Two general points: (i) The MIM attack also applies to quantum cryptographic system [23]-[27]. 
Indeed, that is the easiest way to break a quantum cryptographic system  if there are not enough 
safeguards in the authentication of the two parties during their communication [28]; (ii) such 
attacks are also important in P2P networks [29]. In a real-time communication scenario the MIM 
attacker can be found out by consideration of timing information. 
 
ARP poisoning can be avoided by using the shell script running at the backend which will keep a 
track of entries in the ARP cache table (maps IP address and MAC address) [30],[31]. The 
problem with this solution is that because of periodically generated ARP request there is a lot of 
traffic inside the network and the shell script will run only on Linux, not on windows.  
 
Since we cannot eliminate the MIM attack completely we can try to minimize the possibilities of 
this attack onto the network. Some of these security measures include host hardening i.e. 
operating systems onto the network should be upgraded, network designing from security point 
of view, network devices and the computers onto the network should be updated periodically and 
the patches should be installed regularly. In this way by trying these options practically we might 
try to ensure that the MIM attacks could cause less harm to us.  Nevertheless, MIM attack will 
remain an attack of choice not only for bad actors but also for surveillance groups [32]. 
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